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3. — *The Human Intellect: with an Introduction upon Psychology and the Soul.* By NOAH PORTER, D. D., Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. 8vo. pp. 673.

THIS copious, well-digested treatise will challenge the attention of students of philosophy on both sides of the ocean. It is designed primarily to serve as a text-book for colleges. We once heard an experienced and successful instructor observe, that the best text-books are works not designed for this use, but written to advance the science of which they treat. A book like Locke's "Essay" or Butler's "Analogy" may be a very incomplete presentation of the subject, but, being the production of a master, what it lacks in the power to instruct is more than made up in its power to inspire; and a text-book, like a living teacher, should not only inform, but should likewise stir and quicken the mind of the pupil. The remark is not without force. Yet, generally speaking, it is found impracticable to use manuals in the class-room which were not composed with an eye to such a use, — their want of proportion and completeness, to say nothing of faults of style and other graver defects, outweighing whatever kindling power may be thought to reside in them. The Germans, the best educators in the world, use in all their schools text-books prepared expressly for the purpose. But, in truth, there is no incompatibility between the qualities attributed respectively to the two classes of manuals. A teacher who cultivates his science, not in the spirit of a drudge, but of an enthusiast, will not fail to impart life to the book which contains the results of his thought and acquisition. It may have symmetry of form, at the same time that it has the flavor which distinguishes the native product from the manufactured article.

Professor Porter has exemplified this possibility. His work has the clearness, good arrangement, and completeness which are required in a text-book, while it is throughout a warm and stimulating discussion. The peculiarity of his plan consists in throwing into smaller type a great quantity of illustrative matter, critical, polemical, and historical. Thus the portion which is specially designed for recitation by the student is distinguished from the rest, and, notwithstanding the dimensions of the volume, is by no means formidable in amount. But he is constantly enticed to embark in more abstruse and extended inquiries. The combination of the two sorts of matter is in the main skilfully effected. Not unfrequently the elucidations expand into elaborate essays, as in the remarks on the "Relations of the Soul to Life and Living Beings" (pp. 29 – 40), on the history of the "Theories

of Sense-Perception" (pp. 221 – 247), and on the "Theories of Intuitive Knowledge" (pp. 517 – 526). The wide reading of the author, especially in the modern literature of the Continental, not less than of the English and Scottish schools, is apparent. In one respect, he has an advantage often missed in metaphysical writers. He does not superciliously ignore the recent investigations in physiology, but recognizes their direct and important bearing on psychology. As long as man is composed of body and soul, the one side of his being cannot be understood without a knowledge of the other. The chapters on Sense-Perception give evidence of a close attention to the leading writers on physiological science. But the laws and operations of the mind are not only set forth in the writings of professed philosophers, they are revealed in the higher forms of literature, especially in poetry and the drama. It is a pleasant feature of this volume that aid is unobtrusively drawn from this source, and that Tennyson, Shelley, Wordsworth, Goethe, are found sitting in the philosopher's chair.

Professor Porter writes in an independent spirit, and his system can be identified with that of no one of the leading names in metaphysical science. It is plain that he has given as attentive a hearing to the French and German philosophers as to Reid and his successors. But his treatise, both in its spirit and method, is more nearly allied to the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, perhaps the ablest and certainly the most learned representative of the Scottish school, than to any other system. Still his divergences from Hamilton are neither few nor unimportant. We have noted a few of them, some being of more and some of less moment. He convicts Hamilton of inconsistency (p. 65) in conceding in various places that objects are known in sense and perception to exist in certain relations to other objects, while elsewhere the Elaborative Faculty is defined as the Faculty of Relations. Adopting the doctrine of Natural Realism, Professor Porter still finds not a little to criticise in the Scottish Professor's exposition of the subject. He dissents from Hamilton (p. 236, *seq.*) in holding that sensation involves in some degree knowledge as well as feeling; he thinks that Hamilton fails to define sharply the distinction between an act of perception and an act of thought, — the real difference being, that the former apprehends and judges individual objects, the latter, objects which are general; he thinks Hamilton wrong in founding the perception of extra-corporeal things primarily on the resistance to our locomotive power in the form of muscular exertion, and would himself derive it from the presence and absence of certain muscular and tactual sense-perceptions (p. 183); he regards Hamilton as incorrect and inconsistent in teaching that qualities are apprehended *as such* in sense-

perception, — another example of his failure to discriminate exactly between perception and thought ; that he errs occasionally in confounding the conditions of perception with perception itself, — as, for example, in applying the doctrine of latent modifications of the mind to the phenomena of vision and hearing ; that he attaches too great importance to the idiopathic affections of the nervous system, which are excited by electrical action, indigestion, or a blow ; that, being wrong in his metaphysical assumption that we know directly only phenomena, he is wrong in the inferred doctrine, that phenomena, as such, are the direct objects, and the only direct objects, in sense-perception, — the truth being, that only objects, percepts, or beings are perceived, and the distinction of substance and attribute is the result of an after-thought or reflex process. These and other strictures show that Professor Porter has not blindly followed the Scottish philosopher in this branch of the subject, but has submitted his tenets to a searching examination.

The divergence of Professor Porter from the doctrines of Hamilton is radical, when we come to metaphysics proper. Hamilton, as is well known, accounted for our native cognitions of *substance* and *phenomena* and of *cause* and *effect* by referring them to an imbecility of the mind, an inability to think otherwise. This is one application of his philosophy of the conditioned. Of two contradictories the mind can think neither, but, by the law of excluded middle, is compelled to accept one. In certain cases the mind is determined in its choice between the opposites by moral grounds, by the principle of faith. Professor Porter strikes at the root of this theory by denying the relativity of our knowledge in the Kantian sense. The forms of thought are the laws of things. The antinomies, he holds, are fallaciously propounded and are resolvable. Thus the only support of the "law of the conditioned" falls away. Causation is a positive, intuitive principle, psychologically suggested by the operation of our own mental energies, yet not inferred by analogy, but immediately evident to our intelligence. In place of Hamilton's "Regulative Faculty," Professor Porter places "Intuition and Intuitive Knowledge" as the fourth department of the mind's action. His closing chapter takes up the problem of the Infinite and Absolute. In opposition to Hamilton and Mansel, he contends that these terms do not denote merely negative conceptions, nor are they the objects or products of negative thinking. The Absolute is not, and need not be, the unrelated ; enough that the relation is not one of dependence. Nor are we required to consider the Absolute the sum-total of being. Unconditioned and Infinite cannot pertain to the relations of quantity. Space and Time, for example, are not quantities, but the conditions of quantity. Nor is the Ab-

solute a concept or entity which is divested of all *interior* relations. The Absolute is knowable by a finite mind. Not only can a mind know *that it is*, but it can know *what it is*. To be sure, it cannot be produced or reproduced by the imagination. Neither is it a notion that is the product of reasoning, or one that can be defined in a system of logical classification. But it can be known as the correlate which is necessarily assumed to account for the finite universe. The apprehension of the Absolute is, properly speaking, *knowledge*, although it be not adequate and exhaustive knowledge. An act of faith or belief cannot be conceived of as not involving the element of knowledge. In conceding our belief in the Absolute, Hamilton and Mansel must allow that the Absolute is *in some sense* known, though not in the technical and restricted meaning which they attach to the term *knowledge*.

If Professor Porter is thus critical respecting certain leading features of the recent Scottish philosophy, he is more widely at variance with the Associational Psychology and Metaphysics, of which Mr. Mill is one of the ablest advocates. "The fundamental defect of the associational school consists in this, that it does not distinguish between those activities of the soul by which, so to speak, objects are prepared for and presented to the soul for its varied activities, pre-eminently that of knowledge, and the activity which the soul performs with respect to them when so prepared and presented." "The constant conjunction of two ideas, as a consequent of which one will always suggest the other, does not explain the relation under which the mind connects them in an act of judgment,—least of all the relation by which it joins them in those beliefs which are necessary and intuitive, as are those which concern the relations of space, time, causation, and design." (p. 57.) "J. S. Mill supplements the functions of the associational power, in his theory of reasoning and induction, by resorting to 'an expectation concerning the uniformity of Nature,' which neither association nor induction can account for. Bain resorts to the emotional nature to explain belief; and Herbert Spencer must fall back upon the growth of two nerve-cells into one, propagated indefinitely through successive generations, to account for *a priori* and necessary beliefs." (p. 58.) Turning over to the chapter on Causation (P. IV., c. v.), we find the controversy resumed, on the question whether original intuitions and necessary truths are capable of being resolved into inductions and inseparable associations. Against the theory of Mill and others, it is contended that "time-relations attend, but do not constitute, the causal." The human mind clearly distinguishes the relations of time from the relations of *causality* and of *production*. The advocates of the associational theory overlook the real question, which is to account for our belief

that *every event* has a cause. No mere experience of actual events can establish anything beyond the range of this actual experience. When Mill observes, in reference to events to which we cannot assign definite causes, that "*it is more rational to suppose*" that this inability arises solely from our ignorance, and that the law of causation is applicable, not only within the range of our means of observation, but also "*with a reasonable extension to adjacent cases*," he yields a real, though reluctant, homage to the principle that every event must have a cause. (p. 580.) Induction assumes this belief, for it is involved in the axiom that the "course of Nature is uniform."

On the subject of Final Causes, Professor Porter takes issue with the empirical school in all its branches. He maintains the strict *a priori* character of the notion of design, placing it thus on the same footing with the principle of Efficient Causation. "The point which we assert and defend," he says, "is, that this relation is believed *a priori* to pervade all existence, and must be assumed as the ground of the scientific explanation of the facts and phenomena of the universe." It is "a first principle or axiom of thought." "The relation of means and end is assumed *a priori* to be true of every event and being in the universe; and the mind directs its inquiries by, and rests its knowledge upon, this as an intuitive principle." (p. 594.) In support of his doctrine, the author presents a series of arguments. The mind is impelled to seek for the Final Cause, and is satisfied when it finds that any objects or events are related as means to ends. This relation stands higher, objectively regarded, than that of Efficient Causation, which is only "a stepping-stone and preparation with respect to it." The principle has been of essential use in scientific discovery, as is proved by the examples of Harvey and Cuvier. The whole Inductive Philosophy rests upon it, since the fundamental axioms of Induction presuppose and imply it. It is needed to explain phenomena of organic existence which the relations of efficient causes are incompetent to explain or even to define. The mechanical and chemical properties of the members of an organism do not explain their structure and functions when united in a living whole. The relations of adaptation are alone adequate to this end. It is claimed, that, "the higher we rise in the order of beings, the less we know of the relations of *efficient causes*, but those of *final cause* are more and more various and conspicuous." It is also urged that one of these relations does not displace the other. The principal objections to the belief that design is intuitive are distinctly examined. Such are the mistakes of men in assigning ends; the assertion that we have no means of testing our inductions in respect to ends; that adaptation is a fictitious transference of what we find

within ourselves to external things. This last is no more true here than in the case of efficient causation. To the proposition that so-called adaptations are only the necessary conditions of existence Professor Porter replies, that this class of objections apply only to the doctrine that the belief in final causes is derived from experience; and further, that, beyond the conditions of existence, we find provisions for well-being, for an artificial and elevated existence and enjoyment. The authority of Lord Bacon is shown to be incorrectly adduced against the reality of final causes. Professor Porter brings a familiar passage from the "Essays" to prove that he beheld design everywhere in the universe. He might well have quoted the explicit statement in the third book of the "De Augmentis": "And I say this, not because those final causes are not true and worthy to be inquired in metaphysical speculations, but because their excursions and irruptions into the limits of physical causes have bred a waste and solitude in that track. For otherwise, if they be but kept within their proper bounds, men are extremely deceived, if they think there is any enmity or repugnancy at all between the two." We have not the space even to sketch the train of reasoning by which Professor Porter seeks to make good his thesis. The chapter on Induction, as well as that on Design, really forms a part of the exposition of his views on this topic. The important bearings of his theory on theology are at once discerned. If it be sustained, it places the doctrine of theism on an unassailable foundation.

It is the doctrine of not a few of the ablest philosophers and theologians that belief in God is an immediate act of the soul, appearing as one of the elements of our personal consciousness, — a faith, however, in which feeling, as it is the root, is likewise the predominant element. Thus, as self, and the outward world, so God, is directly manifest to consciousness, being implied in the earliest operations of intelligence and conscience. This doctrine is capable of a psychological development, which, to say the least, gives it the character of plausibility. Something has been done in this direction by Ulrici in his *Gott und die Natur*, and by several other German psychologists. A more attentive consideration of this hypothesis would have been apposite to Professor Porter's discussion.

The drift of this work is strongly adverse to the materialistic tendency of a number of the recent writers on psychology. But the questions at issue between the opposing schools are, as far as we have observed, fairly and temperately stated, and the arguments on both sides candidly exhibited. The aim is to confute, not to stigmatize, opposing doctrines.

We cannot undertake in this place to discuss the opinions advocated

in this extended treatise. Enough has been said to indicate its claims upon the attention of students of philosophy. It is pleasant to see that in the land of Jonathan Edwards the excitement of politics and the attractions of physical science have not extinguished the taste for metaphysical studies. Whatever dissent special portions of this work may awaken, discerning readers will appreciate the acute and vigorous tone of the discussions, the familiarity with the course of philosophical speculation that is everywhere manifest, and the obvious anxiety of the author to meet in a fair and manly spirit the theories and arguments which he seeks to controvert. As a preparatory discipline for the student of theology, law, or physical science, a treatise like the present is invaluable. A full prefatory analysis and a good index facilitate its use.

4. — *La Philosophie Contemporaine en Italie. Essai de Philosophie Hégélienne.* Par RAPHAEL MARIANO. Paris. 1868. 16mo. pp. 162.

A FRENCHMAN, Lévêque, in an essay on the philosophy of Nature, remarks that the Hegelian school, almost extinct in Germany, where it was cradled, is warming into new life under the sultry rays of a Neapolitan sun. This is a high compliment to pay to Augusto Vera, who, after having taught in France, England, and Switzerland, has come back to his native soil to graft on the stock of ancient scholasticism the air-plant of the subtlest of German speculations. If Vera does not succeed, it will not be from lack of learning or zeal or dialectic accomplishment. He has a zealous pupil and champion in Raphael Mariano, who has undertaken to show the shortcomings and weak points of the writers in the last half-century who have attempted to continue the philosophic labors of Vico and Giordano Bruno. Galuppi, Rosmini, Gioberti, and Franchi successively come under his criticism, and he finds them fatally wanting in the substance of sound philosophic thought. Franchi, the latest, is the best; but Franchi is too hostile to religion and the religious element to be a trustworthy guide or a satisfactory thinker. Rosmini and Gioberti, on the other hand, retain too much of their priestly habit, and are in the bonds of their scholastic training, while they pretend to be free, and praise liberty.

It seems improbable that sensuous Italy, with its enervating climate, its wealth of natural scenery, and its omnipresent ruins and traditions, can be brought to accept a philosophy so abstract and transcendental as that of Hegel,—or that a race, living, like the Italians, in external sights and sounds, can come to enjoy such discussions of pure ideas as those